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This paper considers a tourism supply chain (TSC) for package
holidays. Three sectors are included: a theme park, hotel and
accommodation providers and tour operators. The different sectors
are coordinated with each other, while enterprises within each
compete in order to optimize their own objectives. This research
studies the impacts of competitive and cooperative relationships
between the enterprises on the dynamics of the TSC under quantity
competition. Simultaneous non-cooperative games are used to model
the competitive quantity decisions between enterprises in the same
sector. A sequential game is established between the three sectors to
coordinate tourist numbers. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to
examine the dynamics of the supply chain in terms of several
operating parameters, such as operating costs, sector size and product
differentiation. Among the key findings are that member enterprises
in one sector can benefit from intensified competition in a
complementary sector in the same layer and that the upstream
enterprises in the tourism supply chain prefer package holiday
product differentiation strategies.
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Package holidays are becoming increasingly popular due to their cost advantage
and convenience to tourists. Wang et al (1999) define package holidays as tourist
programmes that purposefully consist of a variety of tourist activities, such as
tourist attractions, accommodation, transportation, dining, shopping
experiences, etc. Most of these activities can also be marketed as separate tourist
products, but they are less attractive to individual tourists than packaged
activities. These activities indeed form complex supply chains in tourism
industries.
A tourism supply chain (TSC) includes the suppliers of all the goods and
services that deliver tourism products to tourists (Tapper and Font, 2008). These
suppliers can be configured in different layers or echelons according to their
roles played in the supply chain for package holidays (see Figure 1). The
downstream includes the tourists as end customers. Travel agents are retail
branches of package holidays, dealing with tourists and tour operators. Travel
agents and tour operators can be the same or separate business entities. Tour
operators have direct/indirect influence on the volume of tourism and the choice
of destinations and tourist facilities (Budeanu, 2005; Tapper and Font, 2008).
The midstream of a TSC involves enterprises that directly provide tourist
activities. Typical midstream business entities include theme parks, shopping
centres, hotels, bars and restaurants, handicraft shops and transportation
operators. Upstream enterprises provide raw materials and services to the
enterprises located in the midstream of a TSC. It is important to note that a
typical non-business player in a TSC is the local government, which facilitates
public and private sector collaboration through policy interventions.
A TSC for package holidays operates through business-to-business relation-
ships, and the individual supply chain agents optimize their short-term
financial performance together with their long-term financial sustainability.
TSC management aims to improve such performances by better business
operations and decisions of each supplier and the supply chain as a whole.
The complexity of TSCs leads to significant difficulties in reaching an
equilibrium state of all agents, or the TSC tends to switch between different
equilibrium states. This paper considers a TSC involving three sectors. One
sector includes multiple tour operators and each of them provides only one type
of package holiday. The second sector includes hotel and accommodation
providers. The third sector is a theme park, operating in the destination. Tour
operators are responsible for packaging the holidays, which are sold at the
appropriate prices. The price charged by the tour operator covers costs such as
admission to the theme park and room rates paid to hotel and accommodation
providers. Therefore, pricing is a key mechanism to achieve business
competitiveness among business partners and to realize an individual firm’s
business objectives within the sustainability envelope set out by the local
government.
Indeed, two phenomena of market competition can be observed in the Hong
Kong tourism industry. The first phenomenon is associated with the Individual
Visit Scheme (IVS), which has been implemented in many key cities of
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Figure 1. Tourism supply chain for package holidays.
mainland China since 2003. With the expansion of IVS, more and more
mainland tourists are able to obtain their tour visas and travel easily to Hong
Kong. Tour operators in Hong Kong responded to this opportunity of market
expansion by adjusting the quantity of their product offerings in order to
capture higher market shares. In the field of economics, this type of competition
is typically described as Cournot or quantity competition.
The second phenomenon is related to the practices of some tour operators
who reduce the retail prices of their products in order to increase their demand
quantities. This pricing strategy has had profound impacts not only on other
tour operators, but also on the enterprises of the other TSC sectors such as
hotels, transportation operators and shopping centres. This competition through
a ‘price war’ is typically described in economics as Bertrand competition.
This research will discuss the first phenomenon of the IVS, with two major
objectives. First, we analyse the competition relationships in both the tour
operators’ sector and the hotel and accommodation providers’ sector; the
coordination relationships between tour operators and the theme park and
between tour operators and hotel and accommodation providers. Then, the
impacts of some typical parameters such as operating cost, sector size and
product differentiation on the enterprises involved in the TSC are discussed.
We employ game-theoretic models to examine the competition and
cooperation among the enterprises involved in the TSC. Non-cooperative and
cooperative games have been widely demonstrated in the literature on
manufacturing supply chain management to study such issues as pricing (Lau
and Lau, 2003), quantity discount (Wang, 2002; Viswanathan and Wang,
2003), advertising (Huang and Li, 2001; Jørgensen et al, 2001), quality (Wauthy,
1996; Banker et al, 1998) and configuration (Talluri and Baker, 2002). The
game framework proposed in this paper includes two stages. The tour operators
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first play a non-cooperative simultaneous quantity competition game, noted as
a Cournot game in short. The three sectors in the TSC then play a sequential
game to coordinate the tourist quantities between the sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, essential
literature about TSCs and package holidays and the application of game theory
is reviewed. The subsequent section defines the TSC problem used in this paper.
We then develop quantity competition models for tour operators, hotel and
accommodation providers and the theme park, and present the equilibrium
results of these models. Next, the impacts of three types of parameters on the
three sectors are analysed. Finally, we offer our general conclusions and
recommendations for future work.
Literature review
The literature relevant to this study is reviewed in three groups. They are TSCs
for package holidays, the application of game theory to general supply chain
management and the application of game theory to tourism industries.
In general, the literature on TSCs is very limited. However, several schools
of thought form the foundation for this research. Wang et al (1999) identify
some key elements which constitute a package holiday. Tapper and Font (2008)
describe the structure of TSCs for package holidays. Both Budeanu (2005) and
Tepelus (2005) show the key roles that tour operators play in the TSC for
package holidays. Some literature concentrates on the competitive strategies of
theme parks (Braun and Soskin, 1999), oligopolistic hotel pricing (Baum and
Mudambi, 1995) and government policies (Godfrey, 1998). Some studies have
also focused on observing the relationships between tour operators and the
destinations or hotels. For example, Carey et al (1997) study the influence of
tour operators on the long-term sustainability of destinations. Later, Klemm and
Parkinson (2001) show the impacts of tour operators’ competitive strategies on
the development of tourist destinations. Buhalis (2000) and Medina-Muñoz et
al (2003) analyse the competitive and cooperative relationships between tour
operators and hotels. Theuvsen (2004) concludes that coordination among
enterprises could benefit the tourism industry. The above reviews have focused
basically on the relationship between the two sectors respectively, not from the
perspective of the entire TSC, though they have provided us with some useful
insights to discuss the cooperative and competitive relationships between the
enterprises involved in the TSC.
Significant efforts have been made to study the application of game theory
to competition and cooperation among the enterprises involved in
manufacturing supply chains. Talluri and Baker (2002) consider a three-level
supply chain of suppliers, manufacturers and distributors and develop a hybrid
mathematical programming approach to solve the game. Huang and Li (2001)
use two non-cooperative games and one cooperative game to explore the role
of vertical co-op advertising efficiency between a manufacturer and a retailer.
Non-cooperative and cooperative games have been widely demonstrated in the
literature for manufacturing supply chain management to study such issues as
pricing (Lau and Lau, 2003), quantity discount (Wang, 2002; Viswanathan and
Wang, 2003), advertising (Jørgensen et al, 2001) and quality (Wauthy, 1996;
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Banker et al, 1998). Carr and Karmarkar (2005) show that a multi-echelon
model including three sectors can be set up to observe the competitive and
cooperative relationships in the supply chain. Methods used in these
publications on manufacturing supply chains could be borrowed and extended
to study the TSC, which also includes three sectors but provides non-perfect
substitutable products.
Aguiló et al (2002) examine an oligopoly tourism market in which the tour
operators have market power to fix a higher price without losing their market
share. Candela and Cellini (2006) argue that differentiated oligopoly models
could be used to study tourism development strategies. Taylor (1998) develops
a model to evaluate strategic pricing behaviour in the UK package tour
industry. Wie (2005) builds an N-person non-zero sum, non-cooperative
dynamic game to investigate strategic capacity investment in the cruise line
industry. García and Tugores (2006) apply a vertical differentiation duopoly
model to explain the rationale of coexistence of both high- and low-tariff hotels.
Previous studies that have used game theory in tourism research generally have
been focused on single echelons instead of multiple layers of TSCs. In addition,
tourism pricing strategies have not been studied adequately. This paper fills
these gaps.
Tourism supply chain problem
We consider a TSC that provides package holidays as tourist products in a
destination. It is assumed that there is one major theme park (TP), or a type
of major attraction or event, in this tourist destination and all package holiday
products include a trip to this park as a standard component. The theme park
is operated independently and an entrance fee is charged for each trip. In
addition to this TP, tour operators (TOs) are responsible for configuring their
package holiday products to include other elements such as hotels and
accommodation (HA). It should be noted that this paper does not distinguish
between tour operators and travel agents. Each TO is assumed to provide and
market only one type of package holiday, which includes a trip to the theme
park and a one-night stay in a hotel. Therefore, this TSC includes four sectors
or echelons, namely, one TP, multiple TOs, multiple HA providers and tourists
as customers. In this value chain, a tourist books a package holiday through
a TO at a given price. The price charged by the TO is shared by the other
two echelons: the admission to the TP and fees paid to the HA.
This research is concerned with the competition and dynamics both within
and between these three sectors of TP, HA and TO. Because of multiple
enterprises within the TO and HA sectors, there are internal sector
competitions, each aiming to optimize its own objective. On the other hand,
the TO, TP and HA sectors complement each other in providing package
holiday products. We are interested in identifying the equilibrium of this TSC.
Changes in one sector or its members may induce a series of changes in the
other sectors, which in turn will change the condition of the TSC equilibrium.
Therefore, we are interested in studying the dynamic behaviour of the TSC
equilibrium.
For simplicity, we assume that the TSC is an oligopoly under full information
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Figure 2. Tourism supply chain game structure.
condition, like the market defined by Candela and Cellini (2006). This oligopoly
TSC model involves only one theme park. The number (N) of tour operators
is limited. When N = 1, we have a case of monopoly. Therefore, we focus on
considering the case where N ≥ 2. The package holiday products are assumed
to be imperfect substitutions due to other optional activities such as different
hotels and/or transport used in the products. We further assume that the TOs
work in the same region where tourists can compare and choose their products
freely and the tourists and TOs have perfect information about the products.
Chung (2000) states that hotels with the same star ratings tend to set their
room rates at a comparable level in order to maximize their revenues. This
observation is taken in this study as an assumption that all M (M ≥ 2) HA
providers have the same level of cost to play a classic oligopoly quantity
competition game.
This paper employs the Cournot model to address the above TSC problem.
The TOs and HA providers take quantity strategies to play a simultaneous non-
cooperative game, respectively. Then the three sectors in the TSC play a
sequential game (see Figure 2).
Game model and solution
There are N TOs and M HA providers in the TSC, indexed by 1...N and 1...M.
The prices per unit of TOj, HAj and TP are p j1, p2 and p, respectively. The
unit costs of TOj, HAj and TP are c j1, c2 and c, respectively. The tourist quantities
of TOj, HAj and TP are qj1, q
j
2 and Q, respectively. All tourists taking a
package holiday must visit the theme park and stay one night in a hotel, so
One theme park 
Strategy: {Quantity}
N Tour operators
(Simultaneous game)
Strategy: {Quantity}
M Hotel and
accommodation providers
(Simultaneous game)
Strategy: {Quantity}
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Q = 
N
Σ
j=1
 qj1 = 
M
Σ
j=1
 qj2 (1)
We use the backward method to model this problem and achieve the solutions.
Model for tour operators
Following a common practice in game-theoretic supply chain models such as
Carr and Karmarkar (2005), we assume a linear inverse demand function for
TOj under quantity competition:
p j1 = α – βqj1 – γΣi≠1 qi1 (2)
The ratio γ/β captures the degree of substitution of package holidays. When
γ=0, this means that the products are independent. γ=β indicates that the
products are perfect substitutes. In this paper, the natural restrictions on the
demand parameters are
                                    1
α > –c1 + c2 + c and 0 < γ < β (–c1 = – 
N
Σ
j=1
c j1).
                                    N
The profit function for TOj is
π j1 = q
j
1(p
j
1 – p – p2 – c
j
1).
so TOj determines tourist quantity as
      α – c j1 – p – p2    γqj1 = ––––––––––––– – ––– Σi≠j q
i
1 (3)
            2β          2β
Solving (3) leads to the following Cournot equilibrium for TOj:
      α – c j1 – p – p2      γN(α – –c1 – p – p2)qj1 = ––––––––––––– – ––––––––––––––––––––– (4)
          2β – γ        (2β – γ)[2β + γ(N – 1)]
     N(α – –c1 – p – p2)Q = –––––––––––––––– (5)
       2β + γ(N – 1)
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the derivation of (4).
Model for hotel and accommodation providers
The price for each HA provider from (5) is
                   Q[2β + γ(N – 1)]
p2 = α – 
–c1 – p – –––––––––––––––– (6)
                          N
The profit function for each HA provider is
π j2 = q
j
2(p2 – c2).
So HAj defines tourist quantity as
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      N(α – –c1 – p – c2)     Σi≠jq
i
2
qj2 = –––––––––––––––– – –––– (7)
      2[2β + γ(N – 1)]      2
A system of M independent linear equations has a symmetric solution, so each
HA provider determines tourist quantity as
         N(α – –c1 – c2 – p)q2 = ––––––––––––––––––––– (8)
      (M + 1)[2β + γ(N – 1)]
Model for theme parks
The price for TP from (5) is
                  Q[2β + γ(N – 1)]
p = α – –c1 – p2 – ––––––––––––––– (9)
                          N
The profit function of TP is
π = Q(p – c)
so TP selects tourist quantity as
     N(α – –c1 – c – p2)Q = –––––––––––––––– (10)
      2[2β + γ(N – 1)]
Impact analyses
In the game model, the equilibrium results of prices, tourist quantities and
profits for TOs, HA providers and the TP are shown in Table 1.
We find that both the number of TOs and the entrance cost of TOs are
limited.
Proof. Due to
         M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)        
–c1 – c
j
1qj1 = ––––––––––––––––––––– + –––––– > 0,
     (2M + 1)[2β + γ(N – 1)]    2β – γ
it is easy to get
     M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)       c
j
1 – 
–c1––––––––––––––––––––– > –––––– .
(2M + 1)[2β + γ(N – 1)]    2β – γ
If c j1 ≤ 
–c, whatever N is (N ≥ 2), the above inequality is correct.
If c j1 > –c, the above inequality could be written as
                  M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)(2β – γ)2β + γ(N – 1) < ––––––––––––––––––––––– .
                      (2M + 1)(c j1 – 
–c1)
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Table 1. Equilibrium results for the game model.
       [(3M+2)β+(M+1)(N–1)γ]α+[β+γ(N–1)]M(–c1+c2+c)p j1 = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
                            (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
    (β–γ)(c j1––c1) (11)+ –––––––––
       2β–γ
              M(α––c1–c2–c)           
–c1–c
j
1TO q j1 = –––––––––––––––– + ––––– (12)
        (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]     2β–γ
                 M(α––c1–c2–c)            
–c1–c
j
1
π j1 = β{ –––––––––––––––– + ––––}2 = β(q j1)2 (13)
            (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]    2β–γ
       α––c1–c+2Mc2p2 = –––––––––– (14)
           2M+1
              N(α––c1–c2–c)HA q2 = –––––––––––––––– (15)
       (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
              N(α––c1–c2–c)
2
π2 = ––––––––––––––––– (16)
       (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
       M(α––c1–c2)+(M+1)cp = –––––––––––––––– (17)
                2M+1
           MN(α––c1–c2–c)TP Q = –––––––––––––––– (18)
       (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
          M2N(α––c1–c2–c)
2
π = –––––––––––––––– (19)
      (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
Note: Please refer to Appendix 2 for the derivation of (11)–(19).
Because
  M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)(2β – γ)f ––––––––––––––––––––––
       (2M + 1)(c j1 – 
–c1)
has inverse change with c j1, so
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     2β – γ  M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)N < ––––––[–––––––––––––––– – 1] ,
        γ        (2M + 1)θ
in which θ = max(c j1)––c1.
Due to
       2β – γ  M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)N ≥ 2, ––––––[–––––––––––––––– – 1] ,
          γ        (2M + 1)θ
must be larger than 2. It could be written as
     M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)(2β – γ )θ < –––––––––––––––––––––––– .
           (2M + 1)(2β+γ)
Therefore, the cost of TOs must be less than
M(α – –c1 – c2 – c)(2β – γ )–––––––––––––––––––––– + –c1 .       (2M + 1)(2β+γ)
Based on the above conditions, we can obtain the propositions as follows.
Proposition 1: Under the quantity competition, the effects of a small change in the
operating cost of TOj on the equilibrium price, quantity and profit of each entity in the
TSC are shown in Table 2 and the effects of a small change in the operating cost of
HA providers or the cost of the TP on the equilibrium price, quantity and profit are
shown in Table 3 (+ denotes an increasing trend, and – denotes a decreasing trend).
This proposition shows that when the operating cost of a firm in the TSC
decreases, it is able to reduce its product/service price. As a result, it can attract
more tourists and thus improve its profit. Those TOs whose costs are lower than
the average cost (c j1 < 
–c1) enjoy their cost advantages and attract more customers
and higher profits; those TOs whose costs are higher than the average cost
(c j1 > 
–c1) must set higher product prices in order to remain profitable, resulting
in a loss of customers and profits. If a TO is able to reduce its operating cost,
this reduction will attract more tourists and higher profits from its competitors
in the same sector. In contrast, enterprises of a complementing sector in the
same layer are also able to enjoy benefits from this cost reduction. Another
observation is that when the downstream enterprises reduce their costs, the
prices, number of tourists and profits of the upstream enterprises demonstrate
increasing trends. This finding is important in the sense that downstream
enterprises should reduce their operating costs as much as possible to encourage
the upstream operators to attract more tourists, which benefits the downstream
enterprises. In contrast, if the cost of the upstream enterprise decreases, down-
stream enterprises are able to reduce their prices in order to attract more tourists
and still improve their benefits.
Proposition 2: Under the quantity competition, the effects of changing the number of TOs
or the number of HA providers on the equilibrium price, quantity and profit of each
entity are shown in Table 4.
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Table 2. Effects of cost reduction of tour operator j under the game model.
                       p j1 q
j
1 π
j
1 q
i
1 π
i
1
c j1
                       – + + – –
p2 q2 π2 p Q π
–
+ + + + + +
Note: Please refer to Appendix 3 for the drivation of the results and note that i≠j in Table 2.
Table 3. Effects of cost reduction of HA providers or TP under the game model.
          c2 p
j
1 q
j
1 π
j
1 p2 q2 π2 P Q π
– – + + – + + + + +
c p j1 q
j
1 π
j
1 p2 q2 π2 P Q π
– – + + + + + – + +
Note: Please refer to Appendix 4 for the derivation of the results.
Table 4. Effects of change in the size of the TO or HA provider sector under the game
model.
N p j1 q
j
1 π
j
1
+ – – –
M p j1 q
j
1 π
j
1 p2 q2 π2 P Q π
+ – + + – – – + + +
Note: Please refer to Appendix 5 for the derivation of the results.
This proposition shows that when a new competitor enters the market, the
prices, tourist quantities and profits of the other enterprises in this sector are
affected negatively. The prices, tourist quantities and profits of the enterprises
in the other sector of the same layer will increase, benefiting from competition
within the other sector. For example, the entrance of a new HA provider into
the market will bring more customers and profits for the TP. Meanwhile, the
downstream enterprises are able to reduce their prices so as to attract more
tourists and achieve higher profits once new HA providers enter the market.
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Table 5. Effects of substitution degree of TO under the game model.
γ q2 π2 Q π
– + + + +
γ (c j1 ≥ –c1)                                p j1 q j1 π i1
–                               + + +
Note: Please refer to Appendix 6 for the derivation of the results.
Proposition 3: Under the quantity competition, assuming β to be invariable, the effects
of the substitution degree (γ/β) on the equilibrium price, quantity and profit of each entity
are shown in Table 5.
The substitution degree of products/services provided by TOs defines the
differentiability between their package holidays. The lower the substitution
degree is, the higher the differentiability is. This proposition shows that the
upstream enterprises such as the TP and HA providers are able to attract more
tourists and improve their profits if package holiday products provided in the
TSC are highly differentiated. The TOs whose costs are higher than the average
cost are said to be inefficient. At the downstream of the TSC, the inefficient
TOs could set higher prices once their products are more differentiated from
other package holiday products, as well as attracting more tourists and
improving their profitability.
Conclusions and implications
This paper discussed the competition and dynamics of a TSC providing package
holidays. Simultaneous non-cooperative games were used to model the quantity
decisions between the enterprises in the same sector (for example, tour operators
and hotels). A sequential game was established between the three sectors (that
is, theme park, hotels and tour operators) to coordinate tourist numbers.
Equilibrium solutions of these games were derived for price, quantity and profit
decisions. Sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to achieve useful findings
and observations.
This study has several useful and important managerial implications. Some
of them are summarized as follows:
(1) When a firm in the TSC is able to reduce its operating cost, this firm
should be able to lower its product price to attract additional tourists from
its competitors in the same sector, and thus improve its profitability. The
firms of the other sector in the same layer could also benefit from the
reduced costs of their partners in the complementing sector by increasing
their product prices and sharing more tourists and profits. In addition, the
upstream (downstream) enterprises could also gain more tourists and profits
if the downstream (upstream) enterprises are able to reduce their costs.
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(2) If a new competitor enters the market, the decision makers of the other
firms in the same sector are forced to reduce their product prices. But the
other sector in the same layer will get more tourists and profits, benefiting
from intensified competition in its complementing sector. Meanwhile,
downstream enterprises are also able to reduce their product prices and gain
more tourists and profits.
(3) When the degree of substitution between TOs decreases, those inefficient
TOs whose costs are higher than the average cost are forced to increase their
product prices in order to retain their profits. The upstream enterprises
benefit from the differentiability between package holidays, attracting more
tourists and achieving higher profits.
However, this study also has a few limitations and needs further investigation.
For example, HA providers are assumed to form a hotel chain and offer
accommodation at a unified cost level due to their internal competition. In
reality, package holiday products may use hotels of different grades. For
instance, high-end luxurious packages would use 4- or 5-star hotels. The
consideration of such differentiated hotels would require new game-theoretic
models with considerable additional complexity.
Another limitation of this study is that we examine the competition
dynamics through sensitivity analysis assuming that changes of operating
parameters in the TSC are small enough that they will not lead to changes of
equilibria. It may be more appropriate to incorporate parameters and even
variables (for example, advertisement, quantity discount, health alerts and
seasonal holidays) that affect the dynamics in the game models for theoretical
analysis.
Besides, this study has assumed that individual enterprises in the same sector
in the TSC are of similar status, without any dominance. In reality, some TOs
are much more aggressive and comprehensive than others and they may enjoy
so-called first-move advantages resulting from their dominance in correspond-
ing sectors. It will be necessary to extend the study in the leader–follower game
models.
Finally, only one theme park is considered in our study. A tourist destination
is very likely to have more than one theme park that compete and possibly
cooperate with each other. Therefore, the competition and coordination in the
theme park sector should also be considered in multistage game models.
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Appendix 1
Derivation of the equilibrium quantity for TOj under the
Cournot model
From (3), we get
2β γ  . . . γ   q11  α–c11–p–p2 γ  2β . . . γ   q21  α–c21–p–p2  .  . .    .   .  =     .  (A1) .  .   .  .   .      .  .  .    . .   .      .  γ  γ . . . 2β   qN1  α–cN1–p–p2 
Let us define
2β γ  . . . γ   1 0 . . . 0  1 1 . . . 1 γ  2β . . . γ   0 1 . . . 0  1 1 . . . 1 
S =  .  . .    .  = (2β–γ)  .   .    .   .  + γ  . .  .     .  .  .   .  .   .   .     .  .   . .  .   .  .  .    . .   .   .      . .   . . . .  γ  γ . . . 2β   0 0 . . . 1  1 1 . . . 1 
and
        1         b            b         ab          nb2
(aIn+b1n)(– In – ––––––1n) = In+ – 1n – ––––––1n – ––––––1n = In (A2)
        a      a(a+nb)         a       a(a+nb)     a(a+nb)
From Equation (A2), we obtain the inverse of matrix S as follows:
 1 0 . . . 0  1 1 . . . 1  0 1 . . . 0  1 1 . . . 1 
        1  .   .    .   .             γ  . .  . 
S–1 = ––––  .   .     .  .  – –––––––––––––––––  . .  .   . 
      2β–γ  .   .      . .     (2β–γ)(2β–γ+γN)  . . . .  0 0 . . . 1  1 1 . . . 1 
Let us define
      1
u = ––––
    2β–γ
and
      
     γ
v = –––––––––––––
    (2β–γ)(2β–γ+γN)
Multiplying both sides of (A1) by S–1, we obtain
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q11   u–v –v . . . –v  α–c11–p–p2 q21   –v u–v . . . –v  α–c21–p–p2  .  =  . . . .      .  .   . .  . .      .  .   . .  . .      . qN1   –v –v . . . u–v  α–cN1–p–p2 
Therefore, the equilibrium quantity for TO j is as follows
      α–cj1–p–p2       γN(α––c1–p–p2)qj1 = –––––––– – –––––––––––––––
        2β–γ      (2β–γ)[2β+γ(N–1)]
Appendix 2
Derivation of the equilibrium prices under the Cournot model
Substituting (8) into (6) to get the equilibrium price for each HA provider
     α––c1–p+Mc2p2 = ––––––––– (A3)
        M+1
Substituting (10) into (9) to get the price for TP
     α––c1–p2+cp = ––––––––– (A4)
         2
Solving simultaneous Equations (A3) and (A4) to get
     M(α––c1–c2)+(M+1)cp = –––––––––––––––– (A5)
           2M+1
     α––c1–c+2Mc2p2 = –––––––––– (A6)
        2M+1
Substituting (A4) and (A5) into Equations (2)–(10) to obtain (11)–(19).
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Appendix 3
The effects of cost reduction of TOj under the Cournot
model
In the Cournot model, the derivatives with respect to the cost of TOj are:
∂pj1        M[β+γ(N–1)]         (N–1)(β–γ)––– = –––––––––––––––––– + ––––––––– > 0∂cj1     N(2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]      N(2β–γ)
∂qj1                M               (N–1)––– = – –––––––––––––––––– – –––––––– < 0∂cj1        N(2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]    N(2β–γ)
∂πj1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1 ––– < 0∂cj1           ∂cj1
∂qi1      (M+1)(2β–γ)+N(2M+1)γ––– = –––––––––––––––––––––– > 0, all i ≠ j
∂cj1     N(2M+1)[2β–γ[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂πi1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqi1 ––– > 0, all i ≠ j∂cj1           ∂cj1
∂p2          1––– = – –––––––– < 0∂cj1       N(2M+1)
∂p          M
––– = – –––––––– < 0∂cj1       N(2M+1)
∂q2               1––– = – –––––––––––––––– < 0
∂cj1       (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂Q        ∂q2––– = M ––– < 0∂cj1        ∂c
j
1
∂π2          2(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂cj1       (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂π         ∂π2––– = M2 ––– < 0∂cj1         ∂c
j
1
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Appendix 4
The effects of cost reduction of the HA providers or the
TP under the Cournot model
In the Cournot model, the derivatives with respect to the cost of the HA or the cost
of TP are:
∂pj1     ∂pj1      M[β+γ(N–1)]––– = –– = ––––––––––––––––  > 0∂c2     ∂c    (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂qj1    ∂qj1            M––– = –– = – ––––––––––––––––  < 0∂c2     ∂c      (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂πj1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1 ––– < 0∂c2           ∂c2
∂πj1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1 ––– < 0∂c           ∂c
∂p2      2M––– = ––––– > 0
∂c2     2M+1
∂p2        1––– = – ––––– < 0
∂c       2M+1
∂q2    ∂q2              N––– = –– = – ––––––––––––––––  < 0∂c2     ∂c      (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂π2    ∂π2         2N(α––c1–c2–c)––– = –– = – ––––––––––––––––  < 0∂c2     ∂c      (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂p         M
––– = – ––––– < 0∂c2       2M+1
∂p    M+1
–– = ––––– > 0∂c    2M+1
∂Q     ∂Q        ∂q2––– = ––– = M ––– < 0
∂c2       ∂c         ∂c2
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∂π      ∂π         ∂π2––– = ––– = M2 ––– < 0∂c2       ∂c          ∂c2
Appendix 5
The effects of change in the size of the TO or HA sector
under the Cournot model
In the Cournot model, assuming that N and M are continuous, the derivatives with
respect to N and M are:
∂pj1           βγM(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂N       (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]2
∂qj1           γM(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂N       (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]2
∂πj1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1 ––– < 0∂N          ∂N
∂pj1       [β+γ(N–1)](α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂M       (2M+1)2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂qj1         (α––c1–c2–c)––– = ––––––––––––––––– > 0
∂M    (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂πj1          ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1 ––– > 0∂M          ∂M
∂p2       2(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – –––––––––– < 0∂M        (2M+1)
2
∂q2          2N(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂M       (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂π2          4N(α––c1–c2–c)2––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂M       (2M+1)
3[2β+γ(N–1)]
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∂p     (α––c1–c2–c)––– = –––––––– > 0∂M     (2M+1)
2
∂Q         N(α––c1–c2–c)––– = ––––––––––––––––– > 0∂M     (2M+1)
2[2β+γ(N–1)]
∂π        2MN(α––c1–c2–c)2––– = ––––––––––––––––– > 0∂M     (2M+1)
3[2β+γ(N–1)]
Appendix 6
The effects of the degree of substitution between TOs
under the Cournot model
In the Cournot model, the derivatives with respect to γ are:
∂q2        N(N–1)(α––c1–c2–c)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– < 0∂γ        (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]2
∂π2      (α––c1–c2–c)   ∂q2––– = (––––––––––) ––– < 0∂γ         2M+1      ∂γ
∂Q       ∂q2––– = M–––– < 0∂γ        ∂γ
∂π      M2(α––c1–c2–c)  ∂q2––– = [–––––––––––] ––– < 0
∂γ          2M+1      ∂γ
∂pj1        M(N–1)β(α––c1–c2–c)     β(–c1–cj1)––– = – ––––––––––––––––– + ––––––
∂γ        (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]2    (2β–γ)2
∂qj1        M(N–1)(α––c1–c2–c)        –c1–cj1––– = – ––––––––––––––––– + ––––––∂γ        (2M+1)[2β+γ(N–1)]2    (2β–γ)2
∂πj1         ∂qj1––– = 2βqj1––––∂γ          ∂γ
The following observations can be made:
                  ∂qj1       ∂qj1         ∂πj1if cj1 ≥ –c1, then ––– < 0, ––– < 0, ––– < 0.
                  ∂γ         ∂γ         ∂γ
